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TURNING THE PROTESTER INTO A
PARTNER FOR DEVELOPMENT:
THE NEED FOR EFFECTIVE
CONSULTATION BETWEEN
THE WTO & NGOs
Maura Blue Jeffords∗
If the WTO expects to have public support grow for our endeavors, the public must see and hear and in a very real sense
actually join in the deliberations.1

I. INTRODUCTION

F

ormer United States (“U.S.”) President Bill Clinton’s
words in response to the thousands of protesters that
converged on Seattle during the World Trade Organization’s
(“WTO’s”)2 1999 Ministerial Meeting highlighted an evolving
∗ Columbus School of Law, The Catholic University of America, J.D.
2001; Georgetown University Law Center, LL.M. 2002. The author would like
to thank Terrence Stewart, Managing Partner of Stewart and Stewart for his
guidance as well as Professor Antonio Perez of the Columbus School of Law at
the Catholic University of America and Jaqueline Krikorian, Ph.D. candidate
of the University of Toronto for their comments on earlier drafts. The author
also thanks her husband, Leonard for his support and encouragement in this
endeavor. All errors and omissions are solely the author’s. Ms. Jeffords lives
in Washington, D.C. and may be reached by e-mail at: lenjeff@aol.com.
1
See The New Trade War, ECONOMIST, Dec. 2, 1999, available at http://www.
economist.com/displayStory.cfm?Story_ID=264372 (describing U.S. President
Bill Clinton’s comments regarding the protestors during the World Trade
Organization’s Seattle Ministerial Meeting in 1999).
2. See World Trade Organization, What is the WTO?, at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/whatis_e.htm (last visited Mar.
1, 2003) (describing the history of the WTO as a successor to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”)). The results of the Uruguay
Round included the modified GATT, as well as two new agreements, the General Agreement on Trade in Services (“GATS”) and an Understanding on Dispute Settlement (“DSU”). Id. Four principles characterize the cornerstone of
the WTO: implementation of tariffs through a concession mechanism, elimination of quantitative restrictions, the most favored nation (“MFN”) principle
and the national treatment of foreign and domestic suppliers. Id. The WTO
is headed by a ministerial meeting of its 145 members (as of February 1, 2003)
that meets at least once every two years. Id. A General Council oversees the
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systemic issue facing the WTO as well as a shift in the relationship between international institutions, member states, and
private stakeholders. This issue is whether and how the WTO
should consult with non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”)
and what role these entities should have in the WTO’s function
as the arbiter of the world trading system. Resolution of this
issue will affect the WTO’s efficacy and legitimacy as a global
institution. The WTO’s consultation with NGOs also has ramifications on the relationship between international institutions
and individuals. This issue reflects the shift from the classic
diplomatic model in which nation states alone have a role in the
operation of international institutions to a modern model in
which these institutions consult NGOs to address and to resolve
issues affecting individuals.
This shift presents a challenge for the WTO: how can it incorporate the viewpoints and interests of non-state actors into the
institution’s operations? The presence of the protesters in Seattle had a disastrous effect on the outcome of the Seattle Ministerial Meeting, effectively shutting down the negotiations.
Many of the protesters had purposely gone to Seattle to obstruct
the negotiation of new trade rules. Other protesters went to
Seattle to voice their concerns and opposition to globalization.
A third group, under the confederation of various NGOs traveled to Seattle in hopes of playing a more important role in the
trade talks than that of mere observers. In the end, their presence challenged the classic legal and diplomatic model of international relations.
In the traditional model of international relations, memberships of international institutions like the WTO were comprised
of nation states. Under this model, governments would attempt
to bring the varied interests of its citizenry into harmony and
represented those interests in the international forum. Nonstate actors such as individuals and NGOs could influence their
governments’ trade priorities only through domestic processes,
such as lobbying or petitioning the executive.

ministerial decisions and operates the Dispute Settlement Body and a Trade
Policy Review Body. Id. Reporting to the General Council are the Goods
Council, the Services Council and the Intellectual Property Council. Id. The
WTO is headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland and is headed by a Secretariat
with a 500 person staff. Id.
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However, this model is changing. While the Agreement Establishing the WTO provides that only states may be members,
it also states that the organization may consult with non-state
actors. This provision reflects the modern model in which
NGOs make greater contributions to international institutions.
To be true to its founding principles, the WTO as an institution
needs to adopt the modern model by modifying its structure to
facilitate effective consultation with NGOs.
This Article argues that the present WTO structure for consultation with NGOs lacks a commitment to utilize NGOs in the
construction and application of global trade rules that will
achieve the WTO’s goals. As compared to other international
institutions, the WTO does not recognize the increasing importance of civil society in the functioning of international institutions in the modern era.
The modern era is one in which individuals are aware of the
influence of the multilateral trading system. Since World War
II, advances in communications and transportation have
brought the world’s people closer and made them more economically interdependent. The end of World War II brought the
creation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(“GATT”)3 and its successor, the WTO,4 which continues to affect
the lives of individuals in all states. The WTO’s rules are binding on all its member states and often impute obligations on
non-state actors as well. Moreover, given the impossibility of
any state representing all of its domestic interests, non-state
actors like NGOs arguably should have a stake in the WTO to
give voice to those unrepresented interests.
Part II shows that the source of the tension between the WTO
and NGOs lies in the fact that international law has no uniform
definition of an NGO. Further, throughout its history, the WTO
has been inconsistent in its consideration of the knowledge and
opinion of NGOs even though the WTO places obligations on
them. Despite this inconsistency, the increasing number of

3. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,
55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
4. Final Act Embodying the Result of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, Annex 1A, 1 LEGAL INSTRUMENTS —
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter
WTO Agreement].
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NGOs participating at the WTO represents an incredibly arrayed force that could either further or hinder the WTO’s goals.
Building on the history of the WTO and the magnitude of
NGO interest in influencing the WTO institutionally, Part III of
this paper focuses on the NGOs’ current attendance at WTO
ministerial meetings and symposia, as well as the NGOs’ attempts to play a role in dispute resolution at the WTO. Part IV
examines the arguments for and against increasing access for
NGOs at the WTO’s rulemaking and policymaking fora. While
these arguments are persuasive, they ignore the number of
NGOs that are already attending WTO ministerial meetings
and symposia, and submitting position papers. Furthermore,
the arguments against NGO consultation lack merit when the
WTO’s NGO policy is compared to how other international institutions consult NGOs on their policy and rulemaking activities. These institutions also provide models that the WTO
might imitate to successfully consult with NGOs on policy and
rules without impinging upon member states’ rights.
Part V examines the separate but related issue of NGO participation in the WTO’s dispute resolution process. This Part
analyzes the unique quality of the WTO’s dispute settlement
process, which is not found in other international institutions.
This quality keeps these other institutions from being useful
models of how the WTO dispute settlement panels might consult with NGOs. Part VI addresses the sub-issue of whether
NGOs should be able to bring disputes before WTO panels. The
WTO’s structure and procedure for resolving disputes rules out
the possibility of NGOs being complainants. However, NGOs do
have a role in WTO dispute resolution by way of amicus curiae
briefs. This part proposes that WTO members create specific
and tailored rules to seek and welcome amicus briefs to be used
by the panels to assist in resolving disputes.
This Article concludes with a summary of recommendations
for the WTO and its members to consult NGOs in order to accomplish the WTO’s mission of improving the world’s living
standards through fair trade rules.
II. WHAT IS AN NGO?: A HISTORY
The first step in analyzing the tension between NGOs and the
WTO with the goal of proposing a workable solution is to determine the source of the tension. The current tension between
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the WTO and NGOs derives from the ambiguous and inconsistent definitions of NGOs used by international institutions and
the WTO’s reliance on the outdated traditional model of international relations. The failure to properly define these influential non-state actors explains the place NGOs have at the WTO.
Historically, the treatment of NGOs in the global trading context has not been uniform. Currently, the WTO limits NGO
consultation by characterizing the WTO as a government-togovernment institution. However, the WTO’s short history
shows that the non-state actor is very interested in and committed to furthering the WTO’s objectives. This history and background of NGOs is only the foundation of this tension, but is
critical to understanding the problem and to proposing a solution. The WTO should adopt a structured consultative procedure to effectuate NGOs’ contributions.
What exactly is an NGO? This is not a rhetorical question.
The term “non-governmental organization” plainly means an
organization that is not a government organization.5 More precisely, an NGO is an organization that does not conduct the affairs of a country.6 Specific to the debate about NGOs and the
WTO, Black’s Law Dictionary defines a non-governmental organization as, in international law, “any scientific, professional,
business, or public interest organization that is neither affiliated with nor under the direction of a government; an international organization that is not the creation of an agreement
among countries, but rather is composed of private individuals
or organizations,” which are often granted consultative status
with the United Nations (“UN”).7 The UN includes NGOs such
as OPEC, Greenpeace, and the Red Cross. These definitions
are relevant because although international law does not consistently define “NGO,”8 international institutions label entities
5. See THE OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY AND LANGUAGE GUIDE 671
(1999).
6. See id. See also ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 17 (2001) (arguing that traditional international law posits that States have the exclusive
right to conduct the affairs of a nation). See also TERJE TVEDT, ANGELS OF
MERCY OR DEVELOPMENT DIPLOMATS: NGOS & FOREIGN AID 41 (1998) (theorizing that NGOs are responses to “market or state failures”).
7. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1076–77 (7th ed. 1999).
8. See Oscar Schachter, The Erosion of State Authority and Its Implications for Equitable Development in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW WITH A
HUMAN FACE 37 (Friedl Weiss et al. eds., 1998) (describing how international
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as NGOs based on domestic law.9 Naturally, different definitions from diverse legal systems and cultures create challenges
for international institutions. In response to the challenge, several international institutions and legal scholars have attempted to clarify what type of entity is an NGO, each using
different classifications. However, this selection of definitions
creates ambiguities and misunderstandings about the nature of
NGOs.
A definition proposed by the Secretary-General of the UN
characterizes the trans-border nature of NGOs:
An NGO is a non-profit entity whose members are citizens or
associations of citizens of one or more countries and whose activities are determined by the collective will of its members in
response to the needs of the members or of one or more communities with which the NGO cooperates.10

The Secretary-General’s definition suggests a trans-border
identity for NGOs, implying that NGOs do not have a national
identity per se. While this definition focuses on the geographical scope of NGOs it does not identify a function for NGOs. The
UN Central Evaluation Unit definition addresses this point.
NGOs are “professional associations, foundations, trade unions
and business associations as well as research institutes dealing
with international affairs and associations of parliamentarians.”11 This definition de-emphasizes geography as a feature
law rarely recognized NGOs; rather, an NGO’s juridical status and rights
were determined by national law).
9. See id. at 37. See also TVEDT, supra note 6, at 13–14. The United
States (“U.S.”) defines NGOs according to tax laws. In the U.S. NGOs are
defined as “incorporated entities that qualify for exemption from federal income tax under any of the 26 specific subsections of the Internal Revenue
Code.” Lester M. Salamon & Helmut K. Anheier, In Search of the Non-Profit
Sector I: The Question of Definitions, 3 VOLUNTAS 125–52 (1992).
10. General Review of Arrangements for Consultations with Nongovernmental Organizations: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. ESCOR,
1st Sess., Agenda Item 3, at 4, U.N. Doc. E/AC.70/1994/5 (1994). See also Peter R. Baehr, Mobilization of the Conscience of Mankind: Conditions of Effectiveness of Human Rights NGOs, in REFLECTIONS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM
THE LOW COUNTRIES IN HONOUR OF PAUL DE WAART 137 (Erik Denters & Nico
Shriver eds., 1998).
11. See TVEDT, supra note 6, at 13 (agreeing that national law defines an
entity as an NGO). Tvedt also comments on the diversity of definitions. Some
definitions exclude business and research entities; others exclude trade unions.
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and is also consistent with Kate Wellard and James Copestake’s
research, which defines NGOs as “registered, private independent, non-profit organizations.”12 These definitions individually
are helpful in determining what types of organizations are perceived to be NGOs. However, when these three definitions are
compared, they raise the question of whether NGOs should be
identified according to their function or geographic location.
The answer is neither. To suggest one approach would minimize the importance of the other and possibly exclude legitimate NGOs.
The research of commentators Lester M. Salamon and
Helmut K. Anheier supports this point. Salamon and Anheier
propose four ways to classify an organization as an NGO.13 The
first classification is the legal model, which defines NGOs according to the laws of a country.14 The second classification is
the economic/financial model, which requires that an NGO be a
membership organization with the bulk of its income derived
from membership dues.15 This model excludes any entity that
receives more than 50% of its income from government
sources.16 The third is the functional model, which is a common
criterion used in the development field.17 The functional model
looks at an organization’s functions and working methods.18
Finally, NGOs can be defined using the structural or operational model, which asserts that an entity’s structure and operation will define it as an NGO.19 An organization will be defined as an NGO under the operational model if: the organization is formally constituted, the basic structure is nongovernmental (although government funding is permissible),
the organization is self-governing, profits are not distributed
12. See id. (quoting Wellard & Copestake’s research).
13. See id. at 14 (quoting Lester M. Salamon & Helmut K. Anheier, In
Search of the Non-Profit Sector I: The Question of Definitions, 3 VOLUNTAS
125–52 (1992)).
14. See id. at 13.
15. See id. at 14.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See id. Critics of the functional model cite the model as being difficult
to apply in different countries at different times because highly normative
criteria are used.
19. See id. at 13 (noting that the structural model was the one which
Salamon and Anheier preferred).
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and its membership is to some extent voluntary.20 Salamon and
Anheier’s broad approach is compatible with the WTO’s broad
jurisdiction over and goals regarding trade. This approach also
reflects the varied types of WTO stakeholders representing the
global population (including member states and NGOs) and incorporates the diplomatic and legal nature of the WTO.
This collection of definitions highlights the dynamic nature of
international law and in particular the topic of NGOs’ relationships with international institutions like the WTO. Since
World War II, NGOs have increasingly been recognized as legitimate actors in the global arena.21 This increased recognition
and improved access to decision-makers indicate that international law is moving away from the traditional recognition of
the nation as the supreme player and toward a greater focus on
individuals.22
The WTO has no institutional definition to efficiently filter
stakeholders seeking consultation. As seen, many definitions
are available for the WTO to adopt. Without preferring one
definition over another, this Article advocates that the WTO
adopt a definition that will include those stakeholders who can
help the WTO achieve its mission.
A. Proposed Role for NGOs at the International Trade
Organization
The history of NGOs within the international trade regime is
complicated. The WTO’s proposed predecessor — the International Trade Organization (“ITO”)23 — contemplated a consultative role for NGOs. Article 87(2) of the ITO’s Charter states
that: “[The ITO] may make suitable arrangements for consulta-

20. See id. at 15. The voluntary requirement did not mean its staff was
required to be volunteers, but that, rather, the board of directors did not receive compensation.
21. See LAWRENCE ZIRING ET AL., INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: A POLITICAL
DICTIONARY 425 (5th ed. 1995).
22. Id.
23. See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 37–38 (2d ed. 2002)
(detailing the ITO’s history). The ITO was never created, due in main part to
the failure of the U.S. Senate to ratify the Havana Charter. Id.
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tion and co-operation with non-governmental organizations concerned with matters within the scope of this Charter.”24
Following the Havana Conference, the parties to the Havana
Charter established an Interim Commission of the International Trade Organization which focused on the implementation
of Article 87.25 The outcome of the meeting included a recommendation that the Havana Conference adopt a list of consultants, preferably those NGOs already with consultative status at
the UN Economic and Social Council.26 These NGOs would be
observers at the ITO meetings, have access to all Conference
documentation and have the ability to propose agenda items.27
At meetings other than the ITO’s Annual Meeting, NGOs with
competence in a particular subject matter were to be consulted.28 However, the ITO was never established.29 While
countries negotiating the ITO charter appeared to foresee and
plan for consultation with NGOs, the ITO’s established successor, the GATT, included no language providing NGOs with any
consultative status.
B. NGOs’ status under the GATT
It is unclear whether the GATT Secretariat or the Contracting Parties ever granted NGOs consultative status. During the
th
6 Session of the Contracting Parties, the Contracting Parties
invited representatives from the International Chamber of
Commerce (“ICC”) to make statements regarding three resolu-

24. Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization, U.N. Conference on Trade and Employment, Final Act and Related Documents, art. 87(2),
U.N. Doc. E/CONF. 2/78 (1948), available at http://www.wto.org/english/
docs_e/legal_e/havana_e.pdf
25. INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT,
ACCREDITATION SCHEMES AND OTHER ARRANGEMENTS FOR PUBLIC
PARTICIPATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL FORA 6 (1999), available at http://www.
ictsd.org/html/accreditation.pdf [hereinafter ICTSD REPORT].
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC RELATIONS 76 (2d ed. 1986) (describing the co-existence of the
GATT and the proposed ITO). The GATT was intended to address tariffs
while the ITO would be an institution like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Id.
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tions.30 Despite this invitation, it seems that the ICC representatives never did address the Contracting Parties because a
later note from the GATT Secretariat’s Office indicated that no
NGO had ever been admitted as an observer to any of the GATT
working party sessions.31 The Secretariat’s note also concluded
that no NGO had ever obtained consultative status.32 This
clouded history illuminates the current status of NGOs at the
WTO.
C. Current status of NGOs at the WTO
Article V(2) of the Agreement establishing the World Trade
Organization states: “The General Council may make appropriate arrangements for consultation and cooperation with nongovernmental organizations concerned with matters related to
those of the WTO.”33 The Agreement distinguishes between nongovernmental organizations and other intergovernmental organizations.34 Specifically, the WTO’s General Council is required to make appropriate arrangements for cooperation with
other intergovernmental organizations with similar responsibilities to the WTO.35 Conversely, the General Council has the
discretion to consult and cooperate with NGOs on WTO-related
concerns.36 The WTO Agreement gives NGOs obligations in two
sub-agreements, the Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement
(“TBT Agreement”)37 and the Agreement on the Application of
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (“SPS Agreement”).38
These two agreements include NGOs within their scope. The
TBT Agreement requires members to ensure that NGOs, cen30. See GATT, ANALYTICAL INDEX: GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND PRACTICE 1043
(6th ed. 1994).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. WTO Agreement art. V, ¶¶ 1–2.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See id. ¶ 2.
37. See Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO
Agreement Annex 1A, available at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/
t/UR/FA/17-tbt.doc [hereinafter TBT Agreement].
38. See Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement Annex 1A, available at
http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/UR/FA/15-sps.doc [hereinafter SPS
Agreement].
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tral or national governments, and local governments all follow
the same obligations to set and monitor standards.39 The TBT
Agreement’s Annex I defines a non-governmental body as a
“body other than a central government body or a local government body, including a non-governmental body which has the
legal power to enforce a technical regulation.”40 The SPS
Agreement also contains a requirement that WTO members
ensure compliance with the SPS Agreement by nongovernmental bodies.41 The inclusion of NGOs in the text of
these agreements and the imputation of obligations upon them
provides some justification for NGOs’ demand for more effective
consultation.42
39. See TBT Agreement arts. 3, 8. Specifically, Article 3.1 of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (“TBT Agreement”) requires WTO members to take reasonable measures to ensure that NGOs comply with the TBT
Agreement’s Article 2, which creates obligations for central governments
when adopting technical regulations and standards. Article 8 also requires
members to ensure that NGOs’ conformity assessment procedures comply
with those required of the central government. This provision also highlights
the role of state and local governments in the WTO. While this is similar to
the NGO issue, it is more complicated given the definition of federalism in the
United States. However, as the accompanying database reveals sub-federal
entities have attended and participated as NGOs in the WTO.
40. See id. Annex 1, ¶ 8.
41. See SPS Agreement art. 13.
42. See TERRENCE P. STEWART, THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING
HISTORY (1986–1992), at 1068–77 (1993) (describing the history of the Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement). During the GATT, contracting parties
signed on to a Standards Code that applied to standards developed by NGOs.
The European Community sought to require contracting parties to agree to
use best practices to ensure that NGOs comply with the GATT’s Standards
Code. To this extent the TBT and the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (“SPS Agreement”) can be construed as
obligating NGOs. As WTO members are bound by the TBT and SPS Agreements to insure compliance by NGOs, NGOs will be bound by their national
governments to adhere to the TBT and SPS Agreements. Since no WTO
member can opt out of the SPS or TBT Agreement, any measure taken by an
NGO must comply with the TBT and SPS Agreements.
Obligations are imputed to NGOs because NGO status is determined
by national law; NGOs that place a WTO member at risk of violating a WTO
obligation will face discipline in the domestic setting. See CASSESE, supra note
6, at 78 (setting out the traditional position of international law under international agreements can not create direct rights and obligations for individuals). However, international agreements may oblige the contracting parties to
adopt rules creating individual rights and obligations which are enforceable in
national courts. Id. Cassese later demonstrates that, under modern interna-
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Reading the TBT and SPS Agreements together with Article
V suggests that consultation between NGOs and the WTO is
necessary to effectuate these agreements despite Article V’s discretionary language. However, the WTO sees itself as a government-to-government institution.43 Consultation with NGOs
is thus limited and subject to members’ discretion, which
threatens a productive relationship between the WTO and
NGOs.44
The variety of definitions of NGOs’ rights and duties further
shows that the meaning of the term NGO is unclear. The WTO
treaty language also appears ambiguous if not contradictory
regarding the level of consultation between the WTO and
NGOs. In response to criticism from NGOs regarding the interpretation of Article V, the WTO’s General Council directed
the Secretariat to issue the Guidelines for Arrangements on
Relations with Non-Governmental Organizations (“The Guidelines”).45 The Guidelines recognize that NGOs have a role in the
WTO.46 They also state that the WTO is committed to improv47
ing communication between NGOs and the WTO. The Guidelines further contend that the WTO intends to become a more
transparent institution by publicizing formerly restricted
tional law, states have lost their exclusive power over individuals. Id. at 79.
Individuals as “holders of internationally material interests” have been
“granted legal rights which are operational at the international level.” Id.
States have extended their international obligations to take into account individuals’ demands, concerns and conduct. Id. See also Marsha A. Echols,
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, in THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
207 (Terrence P. Stewart ed., 1996) (arguing that the Committee on SPS
Measures should have a close relationship with NGOs because in many cases
NGOs are able to implement SPS obligations).
43. See WTO Agreement art. V, ¶¶ 1–2. Although the Agreement does not
specifically state that only sovereign states can be members of the WTO, this
principle is based on the specific language characterizing NGOs as distinct
from WTO members and intergovernmental organizations. See, e.g., WTO
Agreement, Annex on Telecommunications, ¶ 7(b) (granting Members discretion to consult with NGOs).
44. See id. art. V, ¶ 2. The language here is the discretionary “may” rather
than the mandatory “shall” of Article V, Paragraph 1.
45. See GATT Secretariat, Guidelines for Arrangements on Relations with
Non-Governmental Organizations, WT/L/162, (adopted July 18, 1996), available at http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/ngo_e/guide_e.htm [hereinafter
Guidelines on NGOs].
46. See id. ¶ II.
47. See id.
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48

documents more quickly. The Secretariat is tasked with developing a closer relationship with NGOs through ad hoc symposia, NGO-initiated briefings, and a mechanism, not then determined, which would disseminate information to delegations
interested in that information.49 The Guidelines state that any
WTO Council or Committee Chair that met with NGOs did so in
an individual, not an official capacity.50 The Guidelines also
emphasize that the WTO was an intergovernmental organization, which prohibited NGOs from being directly involved in the
WTO’s day-to-day work.51 The Guidelines recommend that
NGOs work in closer cooperation and consultation with member
states at the national level because nation states had the responsibility to formulate trade policy.52
Unfortunately these Guidelines do not clarify the meaning of
Article V. Rather, they seem to isolate the member states from
NGOs’ input by directing the Secretariat to issue the Guidelines, which govern the relationship between NGOs and the
WTO, but which were themselves created without input from
NGOs.
Understandably, NGOs consider the Guidelines unsatisfactory. First, the Guidelines task the Secretariat with maintaining relations with NGOs while Article V empowers the General
Council to consult with NGOs.53 The Guidelines shield WTO
members from interaction with NGOs, but it is the WTO members, not the Secretariat that negotiate the trade agreements.54
48. See id. ¶ III.
49. See id. ¶ IV.
50. See id. ¶ V.
51. See id. ¶ VI.
52. See id.
53. See WTO Agreement art. V, ¶ 2.
54. Id. art. IV (describing the General Council as the architect of the negotiating process). See also id. art. IV, ¶ 2 (describing the General Council as
comprised of representatives from WTO member states); id. art. VI (describing the functions of the Secretariat). The Secretariat is international in nature and its duties and functions come from the Ministerial Conference. Id.
Arguably, the issuance of the Guidelines outside of a Ministerial Meeting
usurps the power of the General Council because the Ministerial Meeting
delegates are the same as the General Council. Id. art. IX (describing the
decision–making practices of the WTO). Only WTO members, not the Secretariat, are empowered to make decisions that affect the operation of the WTO.
Id.
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Thus, NGOs have no way of contributing to the negotiation of
trade agreements. The Guidelines are correct that nation
states negotiate trade policy, but the WTO was created to benefit all of the world’s people,55 many of whom are able to speak
only through NGOs.
Following the 1996 adoption of the Guidelines, the WTO formulated a procedure for organizations to attend the Singapore
Ministerial Meeting.56 NGOs were permitted to attend Plenary
Meetings of the Singapore Meeting provided the WTO Secretariat accepted their applications.57 According to Article V,
drafted to regulate how applications were to be accepted, an
NGO must show their activities “were concerned with matters
related to those at the WTO.”58 In preparation for the Cancún
Ministerial in September 2003, WTO members adopted different registration procedures for NGOs to attend the Fifth Ministerial.59 NGOs are directed to file their requests to register and
to provide in detail how their NGO is “concerned with matters
related to those of the WTO.”60 Registration requests will be
coordinated through the External Relations Division, which is a
part of the WTO’s Secretariat.61

III. THE STATUS OF NGOS AT THE WTO
Judging from the number of position papers and amicus
briefs submitted by NGOs and NGO attendance at WTO ministerial meetings and symposia, it is clear that NGOs are deter-

55. See id. at pmbl. (recognizing that the activities of the WTO are intended to raise living standards, to ensure full employment and to expand the
production of and trade in goods at the same time, and to allow for the optimal
use of the world’s resources).
56. See World Trade Organization, Relations with Non-Governmental Organizations/Civil Society, at http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/ngo_e/
intro_e.htm (last visited Apr. 24, 2003).
57. See generally World Trade Organization, WTO Secretariat activities
with NGOs, at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/min01
_ngo_activ_e.htm (last visited May 31, 2003).
58. See id.
59. World Trade Organization, Registration for Non-Governmental Organizations, at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min03_e/ngo_
acc_e.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2003).
60. Id.
61. Id.

File: Jeffords Base Macro Final.doc

2003]

Created on: 5/19/2003 4:04 PM

THE WTO AND NGOs

Last Printed: 1/13/2004 2:24 PM

951

mined to have a formal and uniform consultative role at the
WTO despite the Guidelines’ limitations.
A review of the number of NGOs involved with the WTO confirms existing conclusions and reveals the evolution of the role
of NGOs in the WTO.
More than 1,490 NGOs have had some interaction with the
WTO62 most of which are from Europe and North America.63 Of
that total, approximately 495 come from North America and
555 from Europe.64 Before analyzing NGOs participation at the
WTO, it is helpful to first understand global trade flows. The
following chart details global trade flows between 1995 and
2000.

62. The author compiled a database tracking every NGO that has been
listed as a registrant in a WTO activity or submitted a position paper through
February 2003 or has submitted an amicus brief through May 15, 2002 [hereinafter NGO Database].
The NGO Database organizes NGOs by country and groups them by
region. The regional categories are: Africa, Asia-Pacific, Australia-New Zealand, Central & Eastern Europe, Western Europe, the Middle East, Latin &
South America, and North America. The opportunities listed are broken out
into three categories: (1) Ministerial Meetings; (2) Symposia and Position Papers; and (3) Amicus Brief Submissions. These three categories are further
divided. In the Ministerial Meeting category, attendance is tracked for Doha,
Seattle, the Fiftieth Anniversary in Geneva and Singapore. The Symposia
and Position Papers category tracks NGOs attending the Trade and Development Symposia with United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(“UNCTD”), the Trade and Environment Symposia, the Symposia with Civil
Society and Position Papers. The Amicus Brief section tracks those NGOs
which have submitted amicus briefs to panels by those briefs which panels
have considered and those briefs which panels did not consider. Approximately fifteen NGOs were not able to be located in terms of their home country. The source of the information is the WTO’s website. The database is on
file with author and all questions should be directed to her.
63. NGO Database.
64. Id.
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Figure 1: Global Trade Flows, 1995–200065
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65. See WTO, INTERNATIONAL TRADE STATISTICS 2002 (2002), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2002_e/its2002_e.pdf.
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As Figure 1 shows, the majority of trade occurs between developed countries. However, the trade flow data demonstrates
an overall increase in trade globally. Since the WTO was established, NGOs have had at least eight Article V consultations
with the WTO, have had opportunities to submit amicus briefs
in over 250 disputes, and have had unlimited opportunities to
submit position papers.66 Only one NGO, the ICC, achieved the
highest possible score, a nine, and only two NGOs — the World
Wide Fund for Nature and Greenpeace — have achieved a score
of eight.67 Using four as the median score, eighty-five NGOs
scored above the median.68 Six NGOs had a score of seven; eight
with the score of six and twenty-two and forty-six with scores of
five and four respectively. The highest score for an NGO from a
developing country was a seven for the Consumer Unity and
Trust Society of India. Breaking down the NGOs with a score of
four or better by region, approximately fifty-two are from Western Europe, twenty are from North America, ten are from AsiaPacific, three are from Africa, and none are from Central and
Eastern Europe, Latin and South America, the Middle East, or
Australia/New Zealand. These numbers also show that NGOs
from Europe participated on average 1.9 times, and surprisingly, that NGOs from North America participated on average
1.52 times.69
Facts behind the numbers demonstrate that location of a
meeting or symposia influences the NGOs involved. Those
meetings held in Europe naturally attract NGOs from Europe
while the Seattle Ministerial was overwhelmingly attended by

66. See NGO Database. NGOs consultations with the WTO during ministerial meetings, symposia, position papers, and amicus briefs were calculated
to determine a score for comparative purposes. As of March 2003, ten opportunities arose for NGOS to be consulted by the WTO. These opportunities
consisted of four ministerial meetings, four public symposia, and the unlimited opportunities to submit position papers and amicus briefs determined by
the number of disputes. Opportunities to submit position papers and amicus
briefs were classified into one category for each. Adding the four ministerial
meetings, position papers, and amicus briefs, ten is the minimum achievable
benchmark score.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See id.
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NGOs from North America and predictably so will the Cancún
Ministerial.70

Figure 2: NGO Participation at WTO Ministerial Meetings
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Figure 2 provides the overall level of NGO participation at
the four ministerial meetings. More than 425 NGOs attended
the 2001 Ministerial Meeting in Doha, Qatar as compared to
the approximately 830 at the Seattle Ministerial, 145 at the
th
Geneva 50 Anniversary of the GATT celebration and 115 at
the Singapore Ministerial.71

70. See id.
71. See Figure 2.
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Figure 3: NGO Attendance at Symposia and Position Papers
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(through February 2003)
Figure 3 illustrates NGO attendance at four symposia held in
Geneva, Switzerland: Trade and the Environment (123 NGOs),
Trade and Development (31 NGOs), Symposium on Issues Confronting the World Trading System (244 NGOs) and the most
recently the Doha Development Agenda and Civil Society (355
NGOs).72 NGOs have also submitted position papers,73 attended
scheduled briefings related to the WTO’s day-to-day work, and
met informally with the Secretariat staff and WTO members’
delegations in Geneva.74

72. See Figure 3.
73. Id.
74. See WTO, Doha WTO Ministerial 2001: NGO Attendance (Apr. 12,
2001), at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_/min01_ngo_
activ_e.htm.
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Figure 4: NGO Submissions to the WTO Dispute
Settlement System
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Figure 5: NGO Submissions to Panels — Amicus Curiae75
Submissions
WTO Dispute

EC — Asbestos:
Panel Report,
WT/DS135/R (Sept.
18, 2000)

NGO Submitting
Collegium Ramazzini
American Federation of
Labor and Congress of
Industrial Organizations
(2)
Ban Asbestos Network
Institutor Mexicano de
Fibro-Industrias A.C.(2)
Only Nature Endures (1)

EC — Antidumping Foreign Trade AdminiDuties on Cotton stration submitted by Dr.
Type Bed Linen Konrad Neundorfer (1)
from
India,
WT/DS/141/R:Panel
Report (Oct. 30,
2000)

Action
by
Panel
or
Appellate Body
The Panel took the brief into
consideration because the
briefs were incorporated into
the European Communities
brief.
The Panel did not take into
consideration but did not cite
a reason.
The Panel did not consider
this brief because it was
submitted too far into the
panel process.
Brief was circulated to the
EC and India to make comments. Neither party made
comments, so the Panel did
not take the brief into consideration when it decided
the case.

75. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 83 (7th ed. 1999) (defining amicus curiae,
“Latin for ‘friend of the court,’ a person who is not a party to a law suit but
who petitions the court or is requested by the court to file a brief in the action
because that person has a strong interest in the subject matter”). In The
United States Supreme Court case Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 419 (1908),
future Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis, then a prominent Boston attorney, filed a brief on behalf of the State of Oregon in defense of Oregon’s
statute limiting women factory worker’s days to ten or less hours on the
grounds that the law protected women’s health. The significance of the
“Brandeis Brief” was that it devoted two pages to legal arguments and more
than one hundred pages to sociological, economic, and physiological data on
the effect of long working hours on women’s health. This brief set a model for
future briefs that would be used to present historical, sociological, scientific,
economic and other non-legal information to courts to assist in judicial decision making. See U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Backgrounder on the Court Opinion on the Muller v. Oregon
Case, at http://exchanges.state.gov/education/engteaching/pubs/AmLnC/
br30.htm.
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Earth Justice Legal Defense Fund on behalf of
the Turtle Island Restoration Network, the Humane Society of the
United States, the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Animals, Defenders of
Wildlife, and the Fiscalia
Del
Medio
Ambiente
(Chile). (6)
The National Wildlife
Federation on behalf of
the Center for Marine
Conservation, Centro
Ecoceanos, Defenders of
Wildlife, Friends of the
Earth, Kenya Sea Turtle
Committee, Marine Turtle Preservation Group of
India, National Wildlife
Federation, Natural Resources Defense Council,
Operation Kachhapa,
Project Swarajya,
Visakha Society for Prevention of Cruelty to
Animals (11)
Consumer
Industries
Trade Action Coalition
(CITAC), based in the US
(1)

[Vol. 28:3

The United States decided to
attach the National Wildlife
Federation brief to its submission in this case. The
United States argued that
the Earthjustice Submission
did not appear to be as relevant to the issues in this
dispute as it addressed a
hypothetical issue that was
not before the Panel. The
United States noted, however, that the Panel had the
discretion to accept the
Earthjustice
Submission
directly from the submitters.
The Panel considered those
NGO arguments attached to
the United States’ submission.

The Brief was returned because it contained evidence
that CITAC had obtained
confidential information contained in Thailand’s submission.
Poland and CITAC
were represented by the
same private law firm.
Appellate Body met en banc
and added Rule 16.1 to its
Working Procedures to facilitate the submission of briefs
from NGOs. Procedure was
for this case only and was not
a new procedure under Rule
17.9 of the DSU.76

76. See Additional Procedure Adopted under Rule 16(1) of the Working
Procedures for Appellate Review, European Communities — Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135/9 (Nov. 8, 2000)
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Asbestos Information
Association (United
States); HVL Asbestos
(Swaziland) Limited
(Bulembu Mine); South
African Asbestos Producers Advisory Committee
(South Africa); J & S Bridle Associates (United
Kingdom); Associacao das
Industrias de Produtos de
Amianio Crisotilo (Portugal);Asbestos Cement
Industries Limited (Sri
Lanka); The Federation of
Thai Industries, Roofing
and Accessories Club
(Thailand); Korea Asbestos Association (Korea);
Senac (Senegal); Syndicat
des Metallos (Canada);
Duralita de Centroamerica, S.A. de C.V.
(El Salvador); Asociacion
Colombiana de Fibras
(Colombia); and Japan
Asbestos Association (Japan). (13)

Briefs were returned to the
NGOs because they were not
submitted in accordance with
the adopted procedure. The
Appellate Body included with
the returned brief a letter
detailing the process for
seeking leave.
Only one,
Korea Asbestos filed for leave
to submit a brief under the
procedure detailed.

Association of Personal
Injury Lawyers (United
Kingdom); All India A.C.
Pressure Pipe Manufacturer's Association (India); International Confederation of Free Trade
Unions/European Trade
Union
Confederation
(Belgium); Maharashtra
Asbestos Cement Pipe
Manufacturers’ Association (India); Roofit Industries Ltd. (India); and
Society for Occupational

Applications
from
these
groups were received by the
Division after the deadline
specified in the Additional
Procedure for receipt of such
application.

available at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/135-9.doc.
[hereinafter Asbestos Additional Procedure]. This procedure could form the
basis of a criteria for dispute settlement panels to consult with NGOs.
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and
Environmental
Health (United States).
(6)
Professor Robert Lloyd
Howse (United States);
Occupational & Environmental Diseases Association (United Kingdom);
American Public Health
Association (United
States); Centro de Estudios Comunitarios de la
Universidad Nacional de
Rosario (Argentina); Only
Nature Endures (India);
Korea Asbestos Association (Korea); International Council on Metals
and the Environment and
American Chemistry
Council (United States);
European Chemical Industry Council (Belgium);
Australian Centre for
Environmental Law at
the Australian National
University (Australia);
Associate Professor Jan
McDonald and Mr. Don
Anton (Australia); and a
joint application from
Foundation for Environmental Law and Development (United Kingdom), Center for International Environmental
Law (Switzerland),
International Ban
Asbestos Secretariat
(United Kingdom), Ban
Asbestos International
and Virtual Network
(France), Greenpeace
International (The
Netherlands), World Wide
Fund for Nature, International (Switzerland), and
Lutheran World Federation (Switzerland).
Iron and(17)
Steel
US: Countervailing American
Duties
on
Hot Institute, Specialty Steel
Rolled
Lead
& Institute of North Amer-

[Vol. 28:3

These applications were received by the Division within
the deadline specified in the
Additional Procedure for
receipt of such applications
but were denied because they
did not comply with ¶ 3 of
the Additional Procedures.

The Appellate Body ruled
that it had the legal authority to accept amicus briefs.
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Bismuth
Carbon ica (2)
Steel from the UK:
Appellate
Body
Report,
WT/DS138/AB/R
Group 1: Earth Island
U.S. — Measures Institute/Humane Society
Affecting the Im- of US/Sierra Club (3)
portation
of Group 2: Center for InShrimp: Appellate ternational EnvironBody
Report, mental Law/Center for
Marine ConservaWT/DS58/AB/R
tion/Environmental
(Oct. 12, 1998)
Foundation/Mangrove
Action Project/
Philippines Ecological
Network/Red Nacional de
Accion Ecologica/
Sobrevivencia (7)
Group 3: Worldwide Fund
for Nature/Foundation for
International Environmental Law and Development (2)
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However, it was unnecessary
in this case.

The Appellate Body ruled
that the panel made a flawed
legal
interpretation
that
panels had no authority to
accept unsolicited information from non-governmental
bodies. The Appellate Body
also held that Articles 13 and
12.1 empowered a panel to
modify its procedures after
consulting with the parties to
solicit information from nongovernmental entities. The
AB upheld the panel’s rejection of the briefs because as
panels could seek information from any source; they
also could reject it.

Throughout the history of dispute settlement at the WTO,
more than seventy NGOs have submitted amicus curiae briefs
either to dispute panels or the Appellate Body.77 Most of these
briefs have not been considered by panels or the Appellate Body
as independent submissions, unless they were included in a
party’s submission. However, in the EC—Asbestos case,78 despite criticism from many WTO members,79 the Appellate Body
77. This number is based on references to NGO submissions by panels and
the Appellate Body in WTO opinions. The number is probably a conservative
estimate. See Andrea K. Schneider, Unfriendly Actions: The Amicus Brief
Battle at the WTO, 7 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 87, 96 (2001) (describing NGO submissions to panels that had been rejected automatically; however, in the cases
she cites, there are no mention of these submissions by the panels).
78. The World Trade Organization Appellate Body Report on European
Communities — Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products § 52, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001), available at http://docsonline.wto.
org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/135-11.doc [hereinafter Asbestos Appellate Body
Report].
79. See India Protests at WTO Appellate Body Move Inviting Amicus Briefs,
M2 PRESSWIRE, Nov. 23, 2000, available at 2000 WL 29588646 [hereinafter
India Protests].
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sought amicus briefs, as a procedural matter. The disagreement among WTO members and between the members and the
Appellate Body demonstrates that vague rules on NGO consultation create tensions, particularly when the Appellate Body is
perceived to have created a new right for itself. This debate
also demonstrates that the role of NGO at the WTO has been
evolving in an unforeseen way because WTO members have not
addressed this issue.
The Appellate Body’s request for amicus briefs in the EC—
Asbestos case appears more hortatory than substantive because
they did not influence the Appellate Body’s final ruling. Nevertheless it is significant because of the attention it draws to this
unresolved issue. The issue presented here is not whether
NGOs have a role at the WTO, but rather how NGOs can be
consulted in a way that is meaningful but does not impinge
upon any participating member’s rights in WTO dispute resolutions.
The role of NGOs in the multilateral trading arena from the
proposed ITO through the provisional GATT, and up to today’s
WTO has not kept apace with the increasing recognition that
international institutions must connect to individuals not only
through member governments but also through NGOs. While
effectuating NGO consultation is not on the WTO’s official priority list, the issue is constantly being debated. This debate, if
left unresolved, has the potential to hamstring the WTO’s efficient advancement of liberalized trade rules.80 This history arguably shows that this topic is a controversial one that requires
attention.

80. See Fiona McGillivray, Democratizing the World Trade Organization,
in HOOVER INSTITUTION: ESSAYS IN PUBLIC POLICY NO. 105, HOOVER
INSTITUTION ON WAR, REVOLUTION, AND PEACE 1, 2 (2000). See also JACKSON,
supra note 23, at 61. Efficient advancement of trade rules refers to the consensus-based model of decision-making at the WTO. Relative to other international institutions, the WTO is efficient in that all members are required to
adopt the WTO Agreements as a package. No cherry picking of agreements is
permitted. Id.
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IV. THE DEBATE
A. Three Points of View
The WTO’s official position is that it is an intergovernmental
organization that operates diplomatically. Granting NGOs
greater involvement could potentially impede the diplomatic
process because they work through domestic processes to influence global trade policy.81 However, this presupposes that every
WTO member has a transparent and effective process. The
WTO’s position also assumes that governments incorporate adversarial points of view into a member state’s WTO trade policy.82 The WTO’s official position neglects the fact that, despite
its claim to be a strictly government-to-government organization, the WTO requires global support for it to be effective.83
The WTO faces constant scrutiny as its events and happenings
are beamed instantly around the globe via satellite or transmitted over the Internet with a click of a mouse.
WTO members claim that the WTO already enjoys popular
support because its representatives are democratically elected,
whereas NGOs are not.84 WTO members claim that this empowers them to negotiate rules, later to be ratified in national
legislatures around the world.85 For this reason WTO members
often repeat the WTO’s official position that NGOs should work
through domestic processes.86 WTO members further justify

81. See Guidelines on NGOs, supra note 45, ¶ VI.
82. See, e.g., Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2154 (2000) (requiring the
President of the U.S. to consult with the private and non-Federal government
when negotiating trade agreements). But see Gary P. Sampson, The Environmentalist Paradox: The World Trade Organization’s Challenges, 23 HARV.
INT’L REV. 56, 58 (2002) (suggesting governments do not satisfy every domestic
interest especially in the course of negotiations where bargaining results in
trade-offs).
83. See TOMAS LARSSON, THE RACE TO THE TOP: THE REAL STORY OF
GLOBALIZATION 34 (2001).
84. See McGillivray, supra note 80, at 2–3.
85. See Steve Charnovitz, Opening the WTO to Non-governmental Interests,
24 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 173, 197 (2000).
86. See id. at 197 (describing the WTO members’ viewpoints as a statist
perspective). According to the statist perspective, because the WTO is composed of member states, NGOs have no place of their own and must rely on
their domestic governments to influence the WTO’s agenda. Id. However,
according to the individualist perspective, “as an agency of global governance,
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their refusal to consult with NGOs by claiming WTO negotiations are analogous to legislatures or Cabinet advisors who frequently meet behind closed doors.87 The WTO, they argue,
should not be forced to do what its member states are not.88
WTO members further justify their refusal to consult NGOs
by arguing that many NGOs have a propensity towards violence
and disrupting WTO proceedings.89 Consequently, NGOs who
are genuinely interested in the WTO are suspected of attempting to use this interest to mask a hidden anti-WTO or antiglobalization agenda.90 WTO members suspect that NGOs are
attempting to force the WTO to address issues outside of the
institution’s competence.91 Some WTO members believe NGO
consultation will result in special interests dominating the
WTO agenda over the members’ interests.92
While the viewpoints of all WTO members are essential to
this debate, developing countries are especially concerned about
this issue. Developing countries, which perceive NGOs to be a
well-funded European and North American export,93 fear that
NGO consultation will dilute their WTO membership rights.94
Many developing countries also lack the resources necessary to
fully participate at the WTO and believe that NGOs that do
have these resources will impinge upon developing countries’
the WTO should maintain a vital connection to individuals who inhabit the
planet.” Id. at 202.
87. See McGillivray, supra note 80, at 2.
88. See id. See also HETTY KOVACH ET AL., THE GLOBAL ACCOUNTABILITY
REPORT:
POWER WITHOUT ACCOUNTABILITY? 8 (2003), available at
http://www.oneworldtrust.org/Files/Pubs/GAP%20report/GAP2003.pdf.
This
is a pilot report of an on-going research project on the issue of global accountability. The report evaluated inter-governmental organizations, transnational
corporations and non-governmental organizations on two aspects of accountability: member control and access to information. The WTO scored high
among the five international inter-governmental organizations studied. Undeniably the WTO’s dissemination of information is good once the information
is derestricted. However, the study emphasizes that WTO members, nation–
states, and customs territories control the organization. Id.
89. WTO Conferences are marred by antiglobalization protesters, rallied
by NGOs. The NGOs seeking constructive reform resent violence being associated with their cause. See ECONOMIST, supra note 1.
90. See TVEDT, supra note 6.
91. See McGillivray, supra note 80, at 3.
92. See id.
93. See Schneider, supra note 77, at 100.
94. See Charnovitz, supra note 85, at 210.
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rights as WTO members.95 As shown above, most NGOs are in
fact from Europe or North America, and so these fears may hold
a glimmer of truth.
The reasons put forward to limit NGO consultation are convincing when viewed under the traditional international legal
model. However, this model ignores the instability and inefficiency that occurs when non-state viewpoints are ignored.96
This model also neglects the fact that while the WTO was originally concerned solely with the reduction of tariffs, it has
shifted its focus to creating standards for domestic regulations
and their enforcement.97 The traditional model of international
law assumes state competence in all international law matters,
including international trade relationships. This assumption
has become less true especially since the Cold War’s end, as the
world has seen many governments’ inability, indifference, or
failure to satisfy the demands of their citizens.98 Because of the
WTO’s connection to and impact on individuals, NGOs should
have a greater voice.
NGOs deserve an effective and real consultative role at the
WTO. NGOs can assist developing countries maximize their
power in the WTO and provide technical knowledge, scientific
or other expert advice99 that would assist the WTO members in
negotiating rules in areas like environmental policy, invest-

95. See id. at 211 (stating that many WTO members oppose NGOs because
the presence of NGOs in the WTO arena waters down governments’ status as
official representatives). See Interview with Stephen Porter, Counsel, Center
for International Environmental Law, in Washington, D.C. (Feb. 21, 2002) (on
file with author) [hereinafter Porter Interview] (distinguishing NGOs with
resources from NGOs with little resources to dominate the WTO’s agenda).
96. See generally JANET THOMAS, THE BATTLE IN SEATTLE: THE STORY
BEHIND AND BEYOND THE WTO DEMONSTRATIONS (2000) (chronicling the various NGO groups and individuals present at the Seattle Ministerial Meeting).
See Charnovitz, supra note 85, at 205–06. See also LAWRENCE T. WOODS, ASIAPACIFIC DIPLOMACY: NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 25 (1993) (seeing NGOs as evolving actors in diplomacy).
97. See Jeffrey Atik, Democratizing the WTO, 33 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV.
451, 457 (2001). See also Wolfgang Benedek, Relations of the WTO with other
International Organizations and NGOs, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW
WITH A HUMAN FACE 492 (Friedl Weiss et al. eds., 1998).
98. ZIRING ET AL., supra note 21.
99. See WTO, WTO Assistance for Developing Countries, at
www.wto.org/english/trawp_e/teccop_e/tct_e.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2003).
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ment, intellectual property and competition.100 Considering
NGO advice would add much-needed transparency and legitimacy to the WTO.101 Even if WTO members decided to disregard NGOs’ advice, WTO negotiations would still be more legitimate if an effective consultation framework was in place.
In conclusion, the main justification for NGO participation is
that global society has become more connected in economic relations as a result of the organized multilateral trading system.102
The multilateral trading system has advanced the liberalization
of transportation and communications networks103 and played a
key role in political liberalization.104 As a result, individuals can
know in real time when proposed trade rules or decisions will
affect them.105
In the fifty years of its evolution, the multilateral trading system has seen a tremendous change in the way states and governments relate. The classical international legal theory, which
regarded only states as actors in international law, has transformed into a model recognizing that NGOs and other non-state
actors are legitimate actors in international law. Non-state actors in some instances have more power and ability to influence
decisions than small nation states like Haiti or the Federated
States of Micronesia.106 Developing countries not present during
the original ITO negotiations now comprise a majority of WTO

100. See Sampson, supra note 82, at 57.
101. See James P. Durling, Rights of Access to WTO Dispute Settlement, in
DUE PROCESS IN WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 141, 154–55 (Phillippe Ruttley et
al. eds., 2001).
102. See JACKSON, supra note 23, at 7.
103. See FRANCES CAIRNCROSS, THE DEATH OF DISTANCE 1–26 (1997).
104. See Richard H. Steinberg, Great Power Management of the World Trading System: A Transatlantic Strategy for Liberal Multilateralism, 29 L. &
POL’Y INT’L BUS. 205, 213. See also JACKSON, supra note 23, at 7.
105. See, e.g., LARSSON, supra note 83, at 10 (discussing how the Internet
and technology has advanced the flow of information, in particular to the developing world). See also CAIRNCROSS, supra note 103, at ch. 10 (describing
how technology once thought of as a means for government to monitor its citizens in an Orwellian sense actually has become a way for citizens to hold their
governments accountable through effective communications between citizen
and government and among citizens).
106. See Harold Hongju, Transnational Legal Practice, in THE NATURE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 322 (Gerry Simpson ed., 2001).
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members.107 Individuals are no longer at arm’s length regarding
trade rule negotiation and application.108 While the WTO seems
not to have acknowledged this change in the global legal regime, other international institutions have acknowledged and
embraced this change.109 These institutions provide useful models for the WTO to study, in deciding how they might consult
NGOs in rulemaking and policymaking.
B. How Other International Institutions Can Provide Examples
Of How NGOs Can Be Consulted In Negotiation and Rulemaking without Infringing Member States’ Rights.
Were the WTO to effectively consult with NGOs, it would not
be alone among international institutions. Other international
institutions provide examples of how successful consultation
with NGOs can be permitted without lessening the rights of
member states in the institution. These institutions demonstrate that the traditional model of international relations is
st
not the only available model in the 21 century. Although many
multilateral organizations consult NGOs,110 at least a dozen international institutions provide workable and acceptable models for the WTO to analyze and to emulate for effective NGO
consultation. These institutions are similar to the WTO in
terms of their membership size and scope of activities and include official UN agencies, global economic institutions, and
international institutions whose missions require interaction
with NGO stakeholders in the corporate, environment and labor
areas. The WTO thus appears to fall behind its peer institutions when it comes to consultation with NGOs.

107. See generally GATT. See also JACKSON, supra note 23, at 319–20 (describing the dissatisfaction that many Latin American counties had with the
GATT negotiated in 1947, and viewing the GATT as a disadvantage to developing countries, several Latin American countries having either never joined
the GATT or having delayed joining). The original signatories were Australia,
Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia,
France, India, Lebanon, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Southern Rhodesia, Syria, South Africa, the United Kingdom,
and the U.S. See GATT.
108. See Durling, supra note 101, at 141.
109. See infra part B.
110. See ICTSD REPORT, supra note 25, at 5–6.
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1. UN Agencies
The UN has the same members as the WTO, focuses on globally scoped issues and faces the same logistical challenges in
negotiations.111 UN agencies consult with NGOs as is appropriate for the particular NGO’s size, function, and scope.112 This
tiered structure is flexible enough to allow NGO consultation in
the negotiating forum or in only the preparatory work to the
negotiations.
Article 71 of the UN Charter grants the Economic and Social
Council (“ECOSOC”) the discretion to consult with NGOs.113
The ECOSOC has developed a hierarchical status to facilitate
NGO consultation: An NGO may be placed on the general, specific, or roster status.114 An accreditation process managed by
the Committee for NGOs, comprised of nineteen UN member
states, determines which NGOs are placed on which roster.115
111. See id. at 7–18.
112. See generally id. at 8.
113. U.N. CHARTER art. 71 (“The Economic and Social Council may make
suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organizations
which are concerned with matters within its competence. Such arrangements
may be made with international organizations and, where appropriate, with
national organizations after consultation with the Member of the United Nations concerned.”).
114. See ICTSD REPORT, supra note 25, at 8 (describing the ECOSOC
framework as broken down into three categories). General status is granted
to those NGOs concerned with ECOSOC’s activities. NGOs in this category
are those large NGOs with a broad geographical reach. Special status is the
second category and may be granted to those NGOs with a special competence
specifically with a few fields of activity covered by ECOSOC. The third category is the roster status which may be granted to those NGOs which can make
an occasional useful contribution to the ECOSOC’s work and are available for
consultation upon request. Id.
115. See id. at 7–8. NGOs with a “General Status” can receive the
ECOSOC’s agenda, propose agenda items, send observers to public meetings,
circulate statements of 2000 words or less at ECOSOC and subsidiary body
meetings, speak at meetings and receive invitations to UN conferences. They
also must submit quadrennial reports to the ECOSOC Committee on NGOs.
In contrast, “Special Status” NGOs can receive the ECOSOC agenda, but may
not propose agenda items. They may send observers to ECOSOC and subsidiary public meetings, circulate statements of 500 or less words at ECOSOC
public meetings and 1,500 or less words at ECOSOC subsidiary public meetings, speak at ECOSOC subsidiary meetings (but not at ECOSOC meetings),
and are also invited to UN Conferences. Special Status NGOs must also submit reports to the Committee on NGOs. “Roster Status” NGOs may receive
the ECOSOC agenda but may not propose agenda items. Roster Status NGOs
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Currently, 1500 accredited NGOs have the right to attend
conferences, brief member countries, and propose agenda items.
The UN Conference on Trade and Development (“UNCTAD”)
also has a tiered relationship with NGOs: NGOs are designated
general, special, or national.116 UNCTAD’s Trade and Development Board has granted consultative status to more than 200
NGOs. NGOs participate by attending meetings as observers,
briefing delegates and proposing agenda items.117 UNCTAD also
facilitates the development of NGOs from the developing world
by raising funds from the developed world.118 The tiered relationships or structured frameworks used at ECOSOC and
UNCTAD are not the only model for UN agencies.

may only send observers to meetings within their field of competence. They
may not circulate statements at any ECOSOC public meeting unless invited
to do so. Roster Status NGOs may not speak at ECOSOC meetings, unless
invited by the Secretary-General or a subsidiary body. Roster Status NGOs
are invited to UN Conferences and must submit quadrennial reports. See also
Press Release, U.N., Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations Concludes Two-week Session (Jan. 28, 2000), available at http://www.un.org (describing the Committee on NGOs as nineteen members who decide annually
which NGOs will have consultative status at the ECOSOC and at which tier).
Currently, the Committee on NGOs includes: Algeria, Bolivia, Chile, China,
Colombia, Cuba, Ethiopia, France, Germany, India, Lebanon, Pakistan, Romania, Russian Federation, Senegal, Sudan, Tunisia, Turkey, and the U.S.
Id.
116. See ICTSD REPORT, supra note 25, at 9 (detailing the UNCTAD framework, set out in Article XV of rule 77 of the Trade and Development Board’s
Rules of Procedure and implementing decision 43(VII) as distinguishing between general NGOs and special NGOs). General NGOs have a basic interest
in the Trade Development Board’s activities while special NGOs bring a special competence and specific interest. The Trade Development Board determines which NGOs are granted consultative status and which ones receive
general or special status. NGOs granted consultative status may send observers to public meetings, sessional committees, and subsidiary organs.
They can also circulate documents, may speak upon invitation of the Trade
Development Board Chair and approval by the members and may propose
agenda items. There is also a third relationship category reserved for national
NGOs that may be consulted after the NGO’s member state has been advised.
All consultative NGOs receive meeting and conference documentation. The
UNCTAD Secretary General may distribute Trade Development Board documents as the Secretary-General deems appropriate. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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The UN Conference on the Environment and Development
(“UNCED”)119 is an example of a less formalized mechanism for
NGO consultation.120 UNCED consulted NGOs in the preparatory work for to the Rio Conference.121 Using the ECOSOC’s
rules as a framework, more than 1,400 NGOs participated in
the Rio Conference’s formal and informal meetings,122 made oral
statements as time permitted,123 and by invitation of the
UNCED Secretariat, gave input regarding the drafting of
Agenda 21.124 These UN entities demonstrate that a formal or
informal consultation process can work within a multilateral
institution like the WTO whose membership is large and includes developed and developing countries without impinging
upon member states’ rights.
2. Global Economic Institutions
Looking at other economic institutions provides some insight
as to how the WTO could facilitate NGO access to decision
makers. The World Bank shows the value of a consultative
process where NGOs have access to institutional staff members.
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
is an example of how an institution can facilitate contact between a multilateral institution, member states and NGOs.
The World Bank has an NGO Committee125 that is an informal mechanism for consultation with NGOs.126 The NGO Com-

119. See
United
Nations
Environment
Programme,
at
http://www.unep.org/Documents/Default.asp?Document1D=292 (last visited
June 4, 2003), for a description of the UN’s environmental programs. UNCED
refers to NGOs as “civil society.” See also United Nations Environment Programme, Guidelines for Civil Society Participation, at http://www.unep.org/
dpdl/cso/default.asp?src=New_guidelines.htm (last visited June 4, 2003).
While UNCED has no formal definition of “NGO,” its guidelines contain a
categorization of what organizations qualify as NGOs: “organizational form
used by . . . such as scientific and professional organizations, service clubs,
community-based organizations, consumer unions and environmental citizens’
organizations . . . .” The guidelines also identify functions for civil society to
advance the UN’s environment agenda. See id.
120. See ICTSD REPORT, supra note 25, at 11.
121. Id. at 10.
122. Id. at 11.
123. See id. at 10–11.
124. See id. at 10.
125. Id. at 11.
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mittee is where NGOs can discuss policy with the World Bank
staff.127 The NGOs and World Bank staff jointly decide on
agenda items for the World Bank’s meetings.128 The Committee
is chaired by a Bank staffer and a representative from an
NGO.129
Another institution closely related to the WTO is the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”). 130
The OECD also has a less formal credentialing process for
NGOs.131 Since 1962, labor and employer/industry groups have
been the primary representatives for non-governmental interests.132 Their consultative status entitles them access to the Secretariat and government delegations, permission to follow
OECD committee work, and consultation with the Secretariat
prior to the OECD’s annual meetings.133 During the annual consultations, the NGOs with consultative status can submit their
position papers either orally or in writing.134 NGOs also may
receive general OECD information and some document summaries.135
The consultation processes at the World Bank and the OECD
show how institutions tasked with multilateral economic issues
126. Id. at 11–12 (describing the Committee as being comprised of an NGO
Steering Committee and World Bank staff). The Steering Committee consists
of 15 NGO groups, of which there are 2 representatives each from Africa, Asia,
Latin America and the Caribbean, Eastern and Central Europe, the Middle
East, and North Africa; 2 international representatives and 1 representative
each from Europe, North America and Australia, New Zealand, and Japan.
The members rotate to ensure diversity of opinions. Id.
127. Id. at 11.
128. Id. at 12.
129. Id.
130. See OECD, About: OECD, at http://www.oecd.org/EN/about/0,,ENabout-0-nodirectorate-no-no-no-0,FF.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2003).
131. See ICTSD REPORT supra note 25, at 12 (describing the OECD’s Council
creating criteria for NGOs to consult with the OECD and its members). In
order for the OECD to grant consultative status, the NGOs must: (1) have
wide responsibility in general economic matters or a specialized related area;
(2) have affiliated bodies belonging to all or most OECD members; and (3)
represent non-governmental interests. Only two groups have consultative
status — the Trade Union Advisory Committee and the Business and Industry Advisory Group. Id.
132. See id. at 12–13.
133. See id. at 12.
134. Id. at 13.
135. Id.
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are considerate of NGOs’ viewpoints in their rulemaking and
policymaking processes. Furthermore, these institutions show
how the traditional state-to-state negotiating process has been
supplanted by a model that factors in all stakeholders’ points of
view.
3. The Controversial: International Institutions Consulting
With NGOs Representing Corporate, Labor, and Environmental
Stakeholders
The debate surrounding NGO consultation at the WTO results from the conflicts between WTO members and NGOs representing corporate, labor and environmental issues. Specifically, WTO members are wary that corporate NGOs are attempting to dominate the WTO in order to escape domestic
regulation, and fear that labor and environmental NGOs are
trying to force the WTO to address issues not necessarily within
its scope.136 NGOs representing corporate, labor, and environmental interests have funding, strategic direction, and passion,
and are thus threatening to WTO members.137 For these rea136. See Remi Parmentier, David and Goliath Travel to Qatar, BUS. WORLD
(Manila), Dec. 3, 2001, at P5, available at 2001 WL 31371650. See also
Benedek, supra note 97, at 493; Durling, supra note 101, at 143.
137. See WOODS, supra note 96, at 15; Porter Interview, supra note 95;
THOMAS, supra note 102, at 10 (supporting not only the passion of NGOs but
also highlighting the misinformation propagated by some NGOs). See also id.
at 38 (quoting Martin Fleck, Director of Washington State Physicians for Social Responsibility, who stated: “In the WTO rules, governments are not allowed to subsidize industry within their borders. However there is one big,
huge, glaring exception, and that’s military work — work that can be defined
as in the national interests.”); id. at 53 (interpreting Article III of the WTO to
mean that it is “unlawful for a government to discriminate against products
that are manufactured, harvested or produced in ways that are destructive to
people and/or the environment”); id. at 78 (relating an assertion by Charlie
Kerhaghan, Executive Director of the National Labor Committee, that the
WTO suggests Nike factory workers in El Salvador get a pay cut from $.60 per
hour to $.36 per hour). These are examples of misinformation and mischaracterization about the WTO. Article III of the GATT deals with national treatment. GATT art. III. Exceptions to national treatment can be found in Article XX and give WTO members the power to withhold national treatment in
eight circumstances which include those circumstances “necessary to protect
human, animal or plant life or health” and “relating to the conservation of
exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption.” Id. art. XX.
These exceptions are available provided they are not arbitrary or unjustifiable
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sons, WTO members are hesitant to grant any consultation
rights beyond what is already allowed.138 However, other international institutions consulting with corporate, environmental,
and labor NGOs provide useful models for the WTO.
a. NGOs at the International Telecommunication Union and
International Labor Organization
Two multilateral institutions have been successful at consulting corporate NGOs in the negotiation process. The International Telecommunication Union139 (“ITU”) and the International Labor Organization140 (“ILO”) are two models for how governments confer with stakeholders during negotiations and
rulemaking.
The ITU’s negotiating session, the World Radio Conference
(“WRC”) was last held in 2000.141 A significant number of NGOs
representing private telecommunications and satellite companies, trade associations, and public interest groups were consulted.142 The ITU has three levels of membership: “Member
States,” which is open only to sovereign states and “sector members,” the latter category being open to all other interested and
competent actors.143 During the WRC, ITU members like the
U.S. and the European Community placed private stakeholders
or act as a disguised restriction on trade. Id. Subsidies are permitted in contexts outside of military spending. See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, in Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round
of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. at 1179. There is
nothing in the WTO Agreement, or in dispute settlement panel or Appellate
Body decisions, to support Mr. Kerhagen’s claim alleging the WTO’s ability to
set wage rates for workers in El Salvador or anywhere else. This book ignored
the several hundred NGOs that do understand the WTO’s rules and agreements. Unfortunately, this book also does a disservice to these responsible
NGOs who have an understanding of how the WTO operates.
138. See Schneider, supra note 77, at 100.
139. See ITU, at www.itu.org (last visited Mar. 1, 2003).
140. See ILO, at www.ilo.org (last visited Mar. 1, 2003).
141. See Jennifer A. Manner, A Survey: WRC-2000 and IMT-2000: The
Search for Global Spectrum, 9 COMM. L. CON. 5 (2001).
142. See id. at 10.
143. See ITU, Membership, at www.itu.int/members.html (last visited Mar.
1, 2003). Sector members are national entities and organizations engaged in
telecommunications, radio communications, or development activities such as
network operators, service providers, manufacturers, consultants, financial
institutions, university and research, or regulators.
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holders on their delegations.144 These delegates had access to all
the government officials and broke down typical diplomatic barriers.145
This practice also permitted members from the developing
world to interact with NGOs.146 NGO members of the U.S. delegation did not pressure developing countries to adopt an American perspective through this practice.147 Instead, American
NGOs learned about the concerns and objectives of member
states from Latin America and Africa.148 The interactions between U.S. and European delegates and the delegates from developing countries required the delegates from the U.S. and
Europe to fully consider the developing world’s point of view.
At the end of the WRC, a vote was taken on identifying frequency bands for use by IMT-2000 systems149 and the developing
world carried the greatest number of votes.150
The ILO is an example of an international institution which
consults with NGOs representing corporate and organized labor
concerns. The ILO has a tripartite structure: members’ delegations consist of government officials, usually represented by a
Labor Minister or Secretary; representatives of workers from
the member states; and representatives of employers from that
member state.151 The government representative heads the
delegation.152 The three representatives from a member state
are not required to agree or vote consistently. Employer and
worker NGOs sit on the ILO’s Governing Body along with government representatives. The Governing Body acts on ILO policy, elects the ILO’s Director General and establishes programs
and the budget.153
144. See Manner, supra note 141, at 13.
145. See id. at 24–25.
146. See generally id.
147. See id. at 22–23.
148. See id. at 19–21.
149. Id. at 6. Such systems are commonly known as third generation mobile
systems.
150. See Ambassador Gail Schoettler, Spectrum Allocation: The Developing
World Must be Heard, 1 EUROP. AFFAIRS (2000), at http://www.european
affairs.org/archive/2000_fall/2000_fall_66.php4.
151. See ILO, at www.ilo.org/public/english/depts/fact.htm (last visited Mar.
1, 2003).
152. See id.
153. See id.
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b. NGOs in the Multilateral Environmental Agreements Forum
WTO members are also concerned about consulting NGOs
representing environmental groups. As demonstrated by the
parade of protesters armored in turtle costumes at Seattle, environmental groups possess and employ much passion, determination, and creativity in order to get their message across to
WTO decision-makers.154 Frustrated by their exclusion from
meaningful consultation, environmental groups reacted through
activism.155 Given the close connection between trade and the
environment, environmental NGOs see their consultation at the
WTO as justified.156 Moreover, environmental NGOs have also
come to expect meaningful consultation because of the consultative role they are granted in several multilateral environmental
agreements (“MEA”).
The Convention on Biological Diversity157 grants any NGO
qualified in conservation, sustainable use of biological diversity,
or related fields the right to be an observer at the Convention,
provided that one-third or more of the Convention’s members do
not object.158 The Secretariat administers the accreditation
process which grants accredited observers the right to be invited to make oral statements and distribute documents at
meetings.159 No NGO may vote, nor may they propose agenda
items.160 Distribution of documents is not at issue because all
Convention documents are public.161 NGO observers can attend
almost all meetings except the Budget meetings.162 Other MEAs
like the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora163 and the Montreal Protocol on

154. See THOMAS, supra note 96, at 28.
155. See id.
156. See Porter Interview, supra note 95.
157. Convention on Biological Diversity of the United Nations Conference
on the Environment and Development, June 5, 1992, U.N. Doc. DPI/1307,
reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 818 (entered into force Dec. 29, 1993).
158. See ICTSD REPORT, supra note 25, at 10.
159. See id.
160. See id.
161. See id.
162. Id.
163. See Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora, opened for signature Mar. 3, 1973, art. XI, § 7, 993 U.N.T.S.
243.
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Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer164 also follow these
same procedures for including NGOs in their work.165 These
organizations are a sampling of international institutions whose
members are governments, but which also incorporate NGOs
into their day-to-day activities.
Consultation procedures adopted by these international institutions demonstrate that the WTO is tardy in recognizing the
modern trend toward greater cooperation between NGOs and
international institutions. These institutions are highlighted
not to embarrass or shame, but to persuade the WTO to adopt
an effective consultation process. Clearly the WTO has several
paths it could take in adopting a restructured and more effective consultation process.
The WTO could adopt a hierarchical classification of NGOs to
manage consultation privileges by status. Like the UN’s agencies, the WTO could create tiers that would organize NGO consultation privileges by size, subject matter of an NGO’s focus or
a particular WTO sub-agreement. Emulating UNCED, the
WTO might consult with NGOs during the negotiations or preparatory work for an agreement.
The WTO can also adopt a consultation process like the
World Bank.
According to this model, the WTO could
strengthen the Secretariat’s role in setting agendas for WTO
negotiations. Similarly, the OECD’s informal process could be
attractive to the WTO because it manages NGOs’ interaction
with delegations, coordination with the institution’s staff and
access to staff.
The ITU, ILO, and MEAs demonstrate how the WTO could effectively consult with NGOs in a constructive manner. These
institutions demonstrate how international institutions can effectively consult NGOs without infringing the rights of institutions’ member states. The WTO would also be able to raise
money through NGO dues, which can be invested into building
capacity for developing countries and less developed countries.
164. Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, art.
XI, ¶ 5, Sept. 16, 1987, 1522 U.N.T.S. 3. The Montreal Protocol was amended
four times: in London, 1990; in Copenhagen, 1992; in Montreal, 1997; and in
Beijing, 1999. See UN, Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the
Ozone Layer, at http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/
partI/chapterXXVII/treaty12.asp (last visited Apr. 7, 2003).
165. See ICTSD REPORT, supra note 25, at 10.
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Three important observations can be drawn from the practices of these international institutions. First, the WTO is not
on par with other international institutions with regard to having an effective consultative structure that considers the collective expertise, knowledge and diverse views of NGOs. Second,
consultation with NGOs need not result in a reduction of the
rights or power of any WTO member. Third, any consultation
structure devised by the WTO, would still be subject to approval
by its members who could engineer and determine which NGOs
are consulted and at which level.
The institutions that are connected to their stakeholders and
civil society support the broader point that the level of interaction between international institutions and the individuals,
which these institutions are intended to benefit, is improving so
that public interests beyond those of the sovereign are more
fully incorporated. To be sure, the traditional model, which
only allows states to have a role at international institutions, is
outdated and inefficient. Consultation with NGOs in negotiation and rulemaking will result in the WTO accomplishing its
overall objectives and the Doha development agenda.
As the case has been made for the WTO to change the way it
consults with NGOs in negotiations and rulemaking, a separate
analysis is required to determine what level of NGO consultation within the WTO’s dispute resolution process is appropriate.
V. FRIEND OR FOE: NGOS IN THE WTO’S DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
PROCESS
A comparison to other international institutions’ dispute settlement processes is not helpful in deciding what role NGOs
should have within the WTO dispute settlement mechanism.
The above-mentioned institutions’ procedures for resolving disputes seem archaic in comparison to the WTO.166 The main
166. See ZIRING ET AL., supra note 21, at 353 (describing the UN’s dispute
settlement procedures as recommendations as non-binding). The UN Charter
seeks the pacific settlement of disputes through negotiation, arbitration, conciliation, and use of good offices. The UN Charter acknowledges the most
effective means of dispute resolution is through bilateral negotiations. Id.
See also Bank Information Center, The World Bank Inspection Panel, at
http://www.bicusa.org/mdbs/wbg/inspectionpanel/index.htm (last visited June
4, 2003) (describing the World Bank’s Inspection Panel, the means for individuals and NGOs to redress actual or potential harm to their interests from
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criticisms are their dispute resolution methods are not binding
and their rulings are unenforceable. The debate can only be
analyzed in the context of the WTO and its rules. The issue can
be broken down into two claims NGOs have made for greater
consultation at the WTO. The first claim relates to a fundamental change in the WTO’s dispute settlement process: allowing NGOs and other non-state parties to file disputes against
governments. The second claim is that NGOs and other nonparties should be able to submit amicus briefs to a panel or the
Appellate Body. The positions and concerns WTO member
states need to be considered as well. The WTO’s dispute settlement system will unlikely change to allow private actors,
e.g., NGOs, to file claims, but the practice of NGOs submitting
amicus briefs to panels for review will develop further. The
task for WTO members is to structure a system which will incorporate NGOs without infringing on the rights of WTO members.
These differences must be recognized when analyzing the role
of NGOs in the WTO dispute resolution, either as complainants
or parties in the dispute or as consultants through amicus
briefs. The WTO’s dispute resolution system is different than
the dispute resolution mechanisms of the international institutions mentioned above.167
The WTO’s dispute resolution system has revolutionized the
resolution of disputes between members of international institutions by making its results binding on its members.168 Under

World Bank projects). The Inspection Panel process has had a tarnished track
record of success given that Bank management has been found to intervene in
investigations. See DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW:
TEXTS AND MATERIALS 1129 (Karin Oellers-Frahm & Andreas Zimmerman
eds., 2001) (describing the process for resolving disputes between ITU members which includes diplomacy, procedures under bilateral and multilateral
treaties or any other method mutually agreed upon). Parties may also resolve
disputes through arbitration. A party in theory may choose not to resolve a
dispute. See ICTSD REPORT, supra note 25, at 19 (concluding that the WTO’s
dispute settlement process has a different character than other institutions).
Arrangements with NGOs regarding dispute resolution require the binding
and enforceable nature of WTO decisions to be considered.
167. See Benedek, supra note 97, at 491–92.
168. See Robert E. Hudec, Broadening the Scope of Remedies in WTO Dispute Settlement, in IMPROVING WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES 370
(Friedl Weiss ed., 2000). See also JACKSON, supra note 23, at 125–26.
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the GATT dispute resolution system, which was purely a diplomatic process, a contracting party could choose not to comply
with a GATT panel decision.169 This defect in the GATT was
acknowledged and its change was a priority during the Uruguay Round negotiations which produced the Understanding on
the Settlement of Disputes.170
The Understanding on the Settlement of Disputes171 (“Dispute
Settlement Understanding” or “DSU”) affirms that the WTO’s
dispute settlement system is a process for members to resolve
disputes.172 There are no provisions for non-WTO members to
bring a claim.173 Dispute settlement panels are empowered under Article 13 to seek information from any source, which, as
interpreted, includes individuals and NGOs.174 Panels have interpreted that provision to mean that a panel can actively request information, accept unsolicited information, and can disregard information.175 The Appellate Body under Article 17.9 of
the Dispute Settlement Understanding has the power to define
its working procedures in coordination with the Chairman of
the Dispute Settlement Body and the WTO Director-General.176
The Appellate Body has interpreted this provision as permitting
it to request information from NGOs in the form of amicus
briefs.177 NGOs’ claims should be examined, against this important treaty and factual background.
The first claim, that NGOs have standing to bring a dispute
at the WTO, has little support outside of the NGO community.178

169. See Hudec, supra note 168, at 370.
170. See id.
171. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, Annex 2, in THE FINAL RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS—THE LEGAL TEXTS, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1226
[hereinafter Dispute Settlement Understanding].
172. Id. art. 1.
173. See generally id.
174. Id. art. 13. See infra Figure 5.
175. See infra Figure 5.
176. Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 171, art. 17.9.
177. Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 78, § 50.
178. See Schneider, supra note 77, at 100 (describing India’s justification
against third party NGOs involved in WTO dispute settlement as counterproductive because they will impede the diplomatic process). But see John A.
Ragosta, Unmasking the WTO: Access to the System: Can the WTO DSB Live
Up to the Moniker “World Trade Court”?, 31 LAW & POL’Y. INT’L. BUS. 754
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Under the DSU’s rules, NGOs have no power to bring cases before the WTO.179 Although some scholars agree that NGOs
should have the ability to file complaints because NGOs represent the victims and beneficiaries of the multilateral trading
system, the WTO’s rules do not support this argument.180 NGOs
also assert that they, like any interested actor, should have
standing.181 However, as equitable as the assertion sounds, the
WTO lacks any means for NGOs to accomplish this goal by
their own accord. Another suggestion is that private parties
could also function as private attorneys general, similar to
American antitrust law, putting pressure on the more powerful
players to obey the rules.182 This follows from the view that governments can not represent all interests related to a dispute.183
However, the suggestion might result in private persons, and by
extension, NGOs suing their own governments at the WTO,
which does not seem to be the best use of the dispute resolution
system.184 Practically, there is little incentive for WTO members
to vote to make this systemic change.185 This result follows from
the fact that the WTO’s dispute resolution system is not purely
judicial.186 Furthermore, the binding dispute resolution system
(2000) (referencing Article 50 of the International Court of Justice’s Statute
permitting international courts to accept amicus briefs).
179. See Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 171.
180. See Schneider, supra note 77, at 94–95.
181. See Charnovitz, supra note 85, at 215.
182. See Schneider, supra note 77, at 94–95.
183. See id.
184. See id. at 95.
185. See Durling, supra note 101, at 154.
186. See JACKSON, supra note 23, at 125–26 (classifying the dispute settlement system as a rules-based system focusing on the rule of law). While this
point of view accurately describes the actual panel process, disputes are not
resolved only through litigation at the panel level. Cf. Hudec, supra note 168,
at 370 (asserting that the system is quasi-judicial evolving from the third
viewpoint, a diplomatic process). But see Ragosta, supra note 178, at 739, 741
(describing the WTO as attempting to be a Court for International Trade with
the potential to create international trade common law). However, Ragosta’s
viewpoint ignores that a panel finding does not necessarily translate into a
remedy in terms of a legal ruling. Diplomacy also prevails in many cases in
determining a member’s compliance with a panel’s finding. The reality is that
the WTO’s dispute settlement system is, for lack of a better word, quasijudicial. See Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 171, art. 3. The
WTO resolves disputes through litigation at the panel and appellate processes
as well as through conciliation, mediation and arbitration. Consequently, the
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has become a tool for WTO members to accomplish their trade
priorities.187
In conclusion, NGOs will not achieve consultation through
complainant status because the WTO’s dispute resolution system is not a purely judicial entity. As no incentive exists for
WTO members to change the plainly-worded rules defining who
may bring disputes, it is improbable that this change will occur.188 However, the actions of the panels and the Appellate
Body support the argument that consultation with NGOs is desired in some cases by way of amicus briefs.
According to the WTO’s dispute settlement rules, NGOs do
not per se have the right to submit amicus briefs to WTO dispute settlement panels and the Appellate Body. Rather, panels
including the Appellate Body have interpreted the rules as
granting to them the discretion to seek amicus briefs from NGO
experts and the ability to accept unsolicited briefs. This interpretation of the rules has troubled and angered some WTO
members who characterize the panels’ decisions as overstepping
their mandate.189 This tension between WTO members and the
dispute resolution officials highlights the change occurring in
the treatment of NGO-submitted amicus briefs.
last three dispute settlement mechanisms reveal that diplomacy is alive and
well at the dispute settlement process.
187. See Durling, supra note 101, at 144–45. Members bring disputes for a
variety of reasons. Disputes are commenced when they are of economic importance to a member as in EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones), 1998 WL 25520, available at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDF
Documents/t/WT/DS/26-13.WPF. Disputes are often brought for political reasons as perceived in the recent World Trade Organization Appellate Body
Report, United States — Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales Corporations,”
WT/DS108/AB/R (Feb. 24, 2000), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/
DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/108ABR.DOC, and in the World Trade Organization
Dispute Panel Report, U.S. Complaint Concerning E.C. Regime for the Importation, Sale And Distribution Of Bananas, WT/DS27/R/USA (May 22, 1997)
available at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/27RUSA.WPF.
See William M. Funk, The Thirty-Years Tax War, 22 TAX NOTES INT’L 65
(2001) WTO members also bring disputes because they hope to bring about
systemic change within the WTO. See Durling, supra note 101, at 144–45.
Thus, despite the attempts of NGOs and other non-WTO actors to characterize the dispute settlement system as a court, it maintains its own unique
characterization.
188. See WTO Agreement art. 9, ¶ 1 (describing the decision making process
in the WTO as consensus based. Any member can block changes to the DSU.).
189. See India protests, supra note 79.
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Despite this change, the resistance to the resolution of consultation between the WTO and NGOs through amicus briefs is
worth considering. This resistance focuses on WTO members’
concerns that well-funded, more powerful NGOs will destroy
the effective dispute resolution system by allocating more power
to themselves than to WTO members.190 Contrary to this viewpoint — and more supportive of the WTO as an institution — is
the argument that NGO-submitted amicus briefs offer greater
benefits.
One concern is that panels have the ability to craft new WTO
policy that may not have been foreseen during the negotiation
process.191 Granting NGOs access to the panels might give them
more power than some WTO members to influence WTO policy.192
WTO members are concerned about NGOs’ financial ability to
fund advocacy at the WTO. Some WTO members are suspicious
of NGOs because often the NGOs’ funding and agenda are undisclosed.193 A related concern is that an open amicus brief
process will result in highly skilled law firms not representing
environmental and human rights NGOs, but well-funded industry or corporate groups instead.194 NGOs that had the resources
to continue to submit briefs would become more successful and
have a more persuasive role.195 This thought leads to the point
that amicus briefs might lose their function as information devices and become lobbying mechanisms, and this would raise
systemic concerns.196
Another criticism is that any movement away from the WTO
as being state-centered would threaten the WTO as a system.197
Systemic concerns include the notion that the dispute settle190. See Schneider, supra note 77, at 100. But see USTR Calls for Additional Progress on WTO Transparency (Apr. 4, 2000), available at
http://www.ustr.gov. The United States called for the WTO to make several
reforms to increase transparency. Permitting interested stakeholders to file
amicus briefs was only one suggestion. USTR repeated this call in October
2000 and again in August 2002. Id.
191. See Schneider, supra note 77, at 99.
192. See id. at 100.
193. See id.
194. See id.
195. See id.
196. See id. at 106.
197. See id. at 100.
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ment process is too short to accommodate what could be a flood
of briefs, making the process unworkable.198 A related concern
is that NGOs submitting amicus briefs will prevent effective
and speedy dispute resolution.199 These systemic concerns need
to be addressed seriously and fairly.
The concerns over the money and influence of NGOs on the
WTO by way of amicus briefs assume that the decision to allow
amicus briefs would have no parameters. The process crafted
by the Appellate Body in the EC—Asbestos case, allowing
amicus briefs, offers a promising and workable solution that
would satisfy all members.200 WTO members could modify the
EC—Asbestos process to channel amicus brief submissions so as
not to overwhelm the dispute resolution system or impinge on
any WTO members’ rights or power. More importantly, this
subject is up for debate. NGOs and supporters of increased
NGO consultation by way of amicus briefs must make their case
that this type of consultation offers many benefits for the WTO.
By developing a concrete mechanism for consultation via
amicus briefs, the WTO can deflect criticism that its dispute
resolution system lacks transparency, fairness and legitimacy.201
These arguments could be dismissed if NGOs had an opportunity to present their information, expertise and viewpoints
through amicus briefs.202 Critics who assert that some NGOs
are working behind the scenes at the WTO would be silenced be
opening the process, and promoting fairness.203 By opening up
and regulating the NGO participation process, WTO members
could manage the consultation of NGOs. 204
Another criticism is that the dispute settlement system lacks
legitimacy because in practice panels seem unreceptive to NGO
amicus briefs. One prominent example illustrating this point
was the 21.5 Proceeding205 in the Shrimp-Turtle case.206 Envi198. See Ragosta, supra note 178, at 755.
199. See Schneider, supra note 77, at 99.
200. See Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 78, § 52.
201. See Durling, supra note 101, at 152, 154–55.
202. See Ragosta, supra note 178, at 751.
203. See Durling, supra note 101, at 154.
204. See id. at 156 (advocating that by opening the WTO dispute settlement
to amicus briefs will also build legitimacy for the system and its outcomes).
205. Report of the Appellate Body, United States — Import Prohibition Of
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, AB-2001-4, adopted Oct. 22, 2001,
WT/DS58/AB/RW available at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/
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ronmental groups submitted an amicus brief which was attached to the U.S. government brief.207 The panel only considered the brief’s points that were consistent with the U.S.’s arguments.208 However, if the WTO created parameters triggering
panel consultation with NGOs and these parameters were intended to fully utilize NGO consultation without hindering
WTO members’ rights, then this issue would be resolved.
Essential to this argument is that the WTO’s rules on NGO
consultation need to be written to allow for flexibility to accommodate the concerns of WTO members, especially the special
and differential treatment of developing and less developed
countries. For example, when the parties sought to establish a
panel, they could request that the panel set parameters for
amicus brief submissions. A panel certainly has the authority
to tell NGOs how long a brief could be, how many briefs could
be submitted and the deadlines for submission.209 Panels also
have the authority to accommodate the interests of developing
countries and less developed countries by setting specific conditions for amicus briefs.210 One suggestion is to limit amicus
briefs to only those NGOs from the developing world when developing countries are parties. Important to note in this proposition is that the WTO members would be defining the rules,
not NGOs nor dispute settlement panel members. An important point in this analysis is that NGOs can contribute to the
WTO’s dispute resolution procedure. For too long, the benefit of
NGOs’ contribution has been perceived to be outweighed by the
costs.
NGOs can make valuable contributions to the dispute settlement system through amicus brief submissions. It is unlikely
that NGOs will be complainants in the dispute settlement process. WTO members still view the right to complain as an intergovernmental process that has legal, arbitral and diplomatic
features. Nevertheless, NGOs still have a stake in the outcome
WT/DS/58ABRW.doc.
206. See Porter Interview, supra note 95.
207. See id.
208. See Schneider, supra note 77, at 99 (positing that interest groups unduly influence the WTO based on their identity and resources).
209. See Figure 5, supra (describing WTO panel and appellate body decisions listing panels authority regarding amicus briefs).
210. See id.
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of disputes, because they, like WTO members, collectively account for the interests that will be affected by compliance or an
adverse ruling. A diplomatic compromise could come in the
form of a managed amicus brief procedure which would include
panelists considering briefs. The Appellate Body in EC — Asbestos showed how the amicus brief situation can be managed to
achieve the system’s goals. WTO members should not criticize
the Appellate Body as acting outside its scope but embrace the
decision and draft workable procedures.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NGO PARTICIPATION AT THE WTO
First and foremost, the WTO needs to adopt a definition of
the term NGO that includes those groups that will further the
WTO’s mission. The second priority must be to develop a meaningful consultative status for NGOs. NGOs have interests in
the WTO and should be recognized for the contributions they
make to the global society. In exchange for consultative status,
NGOs could be required to pay membership dues based on the
NGOs’ annual budget. Special provisions should be made for
NGOs from developing and less developed countries so as to
encourage their consultation. NGOs with consultative status
should provide information on their organizations’ membership,
officers, purpose and source of funding. NGOs with consultative status would also submit annual reports about their activities with the WTO.
With consultative status, NGOs would be permitted to observe WTO negotiations, be able to address delegates at the invitation of the Director-General, and submit position papers
within a certain page limit that would be distributed to delegations. Consultative status would be open to all NGOs whose
activities had relevance to the WTO’s activities.211 A committee
of WTO members would review applications for consultative
status, present those NGOs that qualify to the General Council
and grant consultative status unless there was a consensus that
status should not be granted.
Most of the NGOs that have submitted amicus briefs have not
participated in any other WTO activity. NGOs that wish to be
stakeholders need to work at all levels of the WTO, not just
211. WTO Agreement art. V, ¶ 2.
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those that seem to suit their immediate concerns. This does not
mean that NGOs have to participate in every WTO meeting or
dispute. The point is offered to advise NGOs on a means to gain
greater credibility and trust of WTO members. NGOs with consultative status would have the privilege of submitting amicus
briefs at disputes concerning their organization. However, it
seems appropriate for WTO members to adopt a provisional period for the dispute settlement system to be accustomed to this
process. During the provisional period, the Secretariat and dispute settlement body should analyze the interests of NGOs
submitting amicus briefs. Special provisions should also be
made for disputes involving developing and less developed
countries.
Panels can also use their discretion to limit the page numbers
and number of briefs submitted in an individual dispute. NGOs
often cite their lack of resources as preventing them from overwhelming the panels with numerous, lengthy briefs. As seen in
the Shrimp-Turtle212 and other cases, there is nothing to prevent
NGO members from collaborating on an amicus brief. Panelists, at the beginning of disputes, need to show that they are
willing to accept NGO briefs, especially in those disputes where
panels require expert advice and knowledge. For the most part,
panelists are trade generalists and do not always have the expertise in the various subjects in dispute, such as intellectual
property, financial services, telecommunications and tax.213

212. See, e.g., World Trade Organization Dispute Panel Report, Malaysia Complaint Concerning U.S. Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products, WT/DS58/RW (June 15, 2001), available at http://docsonline.wto.
org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/58RW.doc.
213. See, e.g., Echols, supra note 42, at 207 (defining the need for NGOs to
serve as experts for panels reviewing SPS measures). See also Note by the
Secretariat, Mexico — Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services, Constitution of the Panel at the Request of the United States, WT/DS204/4 (Aug.
30, 2002), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/2044.doc (listing the composition of the panel in the dispute over telecommunications services between the U.S. and Mexico. Panelists include Ernest UlrichPetersman, Chairman, a world-renowned trade expert, Raymond Tam, and
Björn Wellenius. Concerns over the Panel’s capability of comprehending the
complex issues related to this dispute are dispelled by examining the background of Mr. Wellenius, Telecommunications Adviser, Telecommunications
and Informatics Division of the World Bank.).
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These recommendations are not an exhaustive list. They
suggest a means by which the WTO may adjust to the evolving
modern state of relations between multilateral institutions,
member states and NGOs representing the individuals intended
to benefit from the multilateral institutions.
The main conclusion to which these recommendations aspire
is the idea that NGOs can be a partner for the WTO. NGOs will
never replace WTO members, but as global actors they have a
role at the WTO. WTO members need to include NGOs in all of
the system’s activities.
Seri Raffia Azziz, the Malaysian Minister of Trade said that
globalization needs a human face, with wrinkles and all.214 Her
message was that the spread of globalization’s benefits is an
evolving process. Her comment is applicable to NGOs’ roles at
the WTO. NGOs can put a human face on the WTO. However,
like the humans the NGOs represent, they need to be included.
The WTO is a fledgling institution, still developing its identity in the global economy. Since its inception, the WTO has
increased its membership to more than 145 countries with another 31 observer countries that are preparing for membership.
The WTO survived the Seattle protests. It has also seen over
280 complaints resolved through consultation, arbitration, litigation and diplomacy. Clearly, the WTO members want the
organization to survive, and this depends on its acknowledgement that the classical diplomatic model on which the GATT
was founded and which has influenced the WTO, is evolving
into a model more suited to an interconnected global economy.
The players in the multilateral trading environment are no
longer only governments. NGOs have an important role in the
multilateral trade arena.
NGOs deserve a more realistic and effective consultative
place at the WTO negotiation and dispute settlement tables.
More effective NGO consultation will ensure the WTO’s survival. This paper recommends more effective NGO consultation, not control. In the end, the WTO members will still write
the rules and cast the votes. WTO members do not have to cede
any power for NGOs to be consulted effectively.

214. See Like Ageing, Let it Happen Slowly, N.Z. HERALD, Dec. 8, 2001,
available at WL27365681.
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In conclusion, as WTO members are tasked by the Doha Ministerial Declaration to conduct negotiations that will improve
the lives of all people, especially those in the developing world,
partnering with NGOs is a smart step in reaching that goal.

